Algorithmics, Social choice, Market Design, and Other Topics

 IFAAMAS, the International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (http://www.ifaamas.org)  is pleased to announce the call for 2021 Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. Nominations are invited for the award which is sponsored by IFAAMAS and will be presented at AAMAS-2022 (https://aamas2022-conference.auckland.ac.nz).     Eligible doctoral dissertations are those defended between January 1, 2021 and November 1, 2021 in the area of Autonomous Agents or Multiagent Systems.   This award includes a certificate and a 1500 EUR payment.   The selection of the dissertation will be based on the originality, significance, and impact of the work. Evidence of such impact include publications at highly selective conferences and journals in the field, with due importance given to the AAMAS conference series and JAAMAS. Research output that resulted primarily from the student's initiative will be considered more favourably. The selection comm...

Our new working paper.  Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Barton E. Lee, and Toby Walsh, October 2021 http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~haziz/fairFLP.pdf Abstract: We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportional fairness. We present several characterization results for mechanisms that satisfy strategyproofness and varying levels of proportional fairness. We also characterize one of the mechanisms as  the  unique  equilibrium outcome for any mechanisms that satisfies natural fairness and monotonicity properties. Finally, we identify strategyproof and proportionally fair mechanisms that provide the best welfare-optimal approximation among all mechanisms that satisfy the corresponding fairness axiom.

  Our work on a bounded envy-free fair division algorithm has been covered in the book "Landscape of 21st Century Mathematics - Selected Advances, 2001–2020" (author: Bogdan Grechuk, publisher: Springer, link: https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030806262). The book covers a list of "great recent theorems from all areas of mathematics."

There is an article in Science on how market design can accelerate COVID-19 vaccine supply: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abg0889#pill-citations  

  https://sites.google.com/view/ijcai-2021-tutorialmdwomoney

  https://sites.google.com/view/2021onlinescwseminars/upcoming-seminars VIDEO LINK Tuesday, 3 August 2021 9AM GMT: 10AM London, 11AM Paris, 12PM(noon) Moskow, 5AM New York, 6AM Rio de Janeiro, 7PM Sydney, 6PM Seoul, 9PM Auckland Speaker: Haris Aziz (UNSW) "Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing"

  Congrats to two of my students Adi and Alex for getting their first conference papers accepted.  https://www.irit.fr/ADT2021/program/ ADT Accepted Paper List:  Andreas Darmann.  Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited Haris Aziz and Aditya Ganguly.  Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules Haris Aziz and Alexander Lam.  Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules Luis Müller and Matthias Bentert.  On Reachable Assignments in Cycles Andreas Darmann, Ulrich Pferschy, Clément Dallard, Peter Muršič, Martin Milanic, Nina Chiarelli, Nevena Pivač and Stefan Lendl.  Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs Nimrod Talmon, Eyal Leizerovich and Gil Ben Zvi.  Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation Paul Alain Kaldjob Kaldjob, Brice Mayag and Denis Bouyssou.  Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model Hugo Martin and Patrice Perny.  Incremental Preference Elicita...