ADT 2021 accepted papers


 

Congrats to two of my students Adi and Alex for getting their first conference papers accepted. 

https://www.irit.fr/ADT2021/program/

ADT Accepted Paper List: 

  • Andreas Darmann. Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited
  • Haris Aziz and Aditya Ganguly. Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules
  • Haris Aziz and Alexander Lam. Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules
  • Luis Müller and Matthias Bentert. On Reachable Assignments in Cycles
  • Andreas Darmann, Ulrich Pferschy, Clément Dallard, Peter Muršič, Martin Milanic, Nina Chiarelli, Nevena Pivač and Stefan Lendl. Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs
  • Nimrod Talmon, Eyal Leizerovich and Gil Ben Zvi. Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation
  • Paul Alain Kaldjob Kaldjob, Brice Mayag and Denis Bouyssou. Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model
  • Hugo Martin and Patrice Perny. Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals
  • Xudong Liu and Mirek Truszczynski. Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees
  • Beatrice Napolitano, Olivier Cailloux and Paolo Viappiani. Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination
  • Leora Schmerler and Noam Hazon. Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams
  • Loïc Adam and Sébastien Destercke. Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist?
  • Abu Mohammad Hammad Ali, Elizabeth Rayner, Howard J. Hamilton, Boting Yang and Sandra Zilles. Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks
  • Thekla Hamm, Martin Lackner and Anna Rapberger. Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences
  • Ruben Becker, Gianlorenzo D’Angelo, Esmaeil Delfaraz and Hugo Gilbert. When Can Liquid Democracy Unveil the Truth?
  • Yongjie Yang. The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Defending YourWinners
  • Laurent Gourves, Julien Lesca and Anaëlle Wilczynski. On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods
  • Linus Boes, Dorothea Baumeister and Johanna Hillebrand. Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting
  • Joanna Kaczmarek and Jörg Rothe. Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games
  • Nawal Benabbou, Cassandre Leroy, Thibaut Lust and Patrice Perny. Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints
  • Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret and Nicolas Maudet. Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average
  • Arnaud Grivet Sébert, Nicolas Maudet, Patrice Perny and Paolo Viappiani. Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model
  • Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard and Magdaléna Tydrichova. Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights
  • Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo and Makoto Yokoo. Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information
  • Ben Abramowitz, Ehud Shapiro and Nimrod Talmon. In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution
  • Ben Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro and Nimrod Talmon. Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice
  • Kshitija Taywade, Judy Goldsmith and Brent Harrison. Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching

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