Two birds with one stone
The World Congress on Game Theory which was held in July this year was an opportunity to attend a number of great talks. Three of the talks had an interesting similarity. In each of these talks, the speaker examined a two-sided matching problem and presented a single mechanism which encapsulates two previously introduced well-known mechanisms. Generalized Matching for School Choice Atila Abdulkadirogolu The school choice problem can be formulated as two-sided matching problem with one-sided preferences (if school only have priorities over students but not preferences) or 2-sided matching problem with two-sided preferences (schools are also strategic agents with preferences over students). Abdulkadirogolu introduces a more general hybrid model which covers both the settings. His Stable Transfer Cycles (STC) algorithm for the hybrid model reduces to the Top Trading Cycles ( TTC) algorithm in the case of one-sided preferences and Student Optimal Stable Matching (S...