Algorithmics, Social choice, Market Design, and Other Topics

Computational social choice is a burgeoning subject which uses methods from Computer Science and ideas from Social Sciences. In what follows, I will briefly describe an even more interesting recent interplay of fields namely extremal combinatorics and social choice theory. This interesting connection  was described in an enjoyable  talk given by Felix Brandt last week in the TUM Mathematics Department . A key goal in social choice theory is to find suitable social choice functions which satisfy desirable axioms. This quest for finding suitable functions was given a jolt by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem  that showed that even finding a social choice function which satisfies a set of very mild and desirable axioms is impossible. Since then social choice theorists have been trying to further relax desirable axioms to circumvent Arrow’s theorem. In this line of work, an intriguing case is that of a function called the Tournament Equilibrium Set (TEQ) which ...

From the COST website : The COST  Action  on Computational Social Choice will address the fundamental new challenges in the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making raised by recent technological advances in areas such as social networks, electronic commerce, webpage ranking, and e-governance. Computational Social Choice is a novel and innovative research trend that is now gathering substantial momentum, especially in the European research arena. It combines methods from Computer Science with insights from Economic Theory. The  Action  will provide a much needed framework for coordinating research efforts in this important new field at the European level. The scientific programme will focus on four thematic areas: (1) voting and elections, (2) fair division, (3) information merging, and (4) matching mechanisms. In organisational terms, the  Action  will particularly emphasise the close involvement of Early-Stage Researchers