Algorithmics, Social choice, Market Design, and Other Topics

The latest volume of Economic Theory is based on a symposium organized by Prof von Stengel a while ago. The volume is totally focused on algorithmic techniques for the computation of Nash equlibria in finite games. It includes a well written and accessible  overview by Tim Roughgarden on the relevant computational complexity concepts for equilibrium computation.

2007 But Who Will Guard the Guardians? Leonid Hurwicz Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals Eric S. Maskin Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory  Roger B. Myerson  2005 War and Peace Robert J. Aumann An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima Thomas C. Schelling 1998  The Possibility of Social Choice Amartya Sen 1994  Games with Incomplete Information John C. Harsanyi John Nash   Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames Richard Selten   1978   Rational Decision-Making in Business Organization s Herbert Simon

Mathematics of Phase Transitions: Past, Present, Future Date: Thursday 12 to Sunday 15 November 2009;  Venue: Mathematics Institute, University of Warwick Speakers include among others: Christian Borgs, David Brydges, John Cardy, Jean-Dominique Deuschel, Roberto Fernández, Ostap Hryniv, Dima Ioffe, Wilfrid Kendall,  Wolfgang König, Peter Mörters, Stephan Luckhaus, Charles-Édouard Pfister, Balint Tóth. The meeting  will also celebrate Prof. Roman Kotecky's 60th birthday.

COMSOC 2010 which will be held in Düsseldorf, Germany from 13 to 16 September 2010 has an impressive speaker list. It is good to see that notable economists are taking interest in the new discipline emerging at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. Gabrielle Demange (Paris School of Economics; tentative) Matthew O. Jackson (Stanford University) Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne) Hervé Moulin (Rice University) Hannu Nurmi (University of Turku)

The accepted paper list of The First Symposium on Innovations in Computer Science (ICS 2010) is out. There is a sizable subset of papers broadly in the domain of algorithmic game theory: Are Stable Instances Easy? by Yonatan Bilu and Nathan Linial Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions by Jing Chen, Silvio Micali, and Paul Valiant Guaranteeing Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players by Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, and Silvio Micali A New Look at Selfish Routing by Christos Papadimitriou and Gregory Valiant Game Theory with Costly Computation by Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass Adversarial Leakage in Games by Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions by Brendan Lucierr Playing games without observing payoffs by Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai and Moshe Tennenholtz Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities by Vijay V. Vazirani and Mihalis Yannakakis Bo...

Terrance Tao was awarded the Alan T. Waterman award in 2008. The Alan T. Waterman is the highest US award for scientists no older than 35.         There is a recent National Science Foundation sponsored video which includes an interview of Tao. The theme is basic mathematical research, its nature, its importance and its impact.  

http://www.sigecom.org/ec09/schedule_tutorials.html http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/conference/adfocs/material.html