The First Symposium on Innovations in Computer Science (ICS 2010)

The accepted paper list of The First Symposium on Innovations in Computer Science (ICS 2010) is out. There is a sizable subset of papers broadly in the domain of algorithmic game theory:

  • Are Stable Instances Easy? by Yonatan Bilu and Nathan Linial
  • Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions by Jing Chen, Silvio Micali, and Paul Valiant
  • Guaranteeing Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players by Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, and Silvio Micali
  • A New Look at Selfish Routing by Christos Papadimitriou and Gregory Valiant
  • Game Theory with Costly Computation by Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass
  • Adversarial Leakage in Games by Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions by Brendan Lucierr
  • Playing games without observing payoffs by Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities by Vijay V. Vazirani and Mihalis Yannakakis
  • Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time by Lance Fortnow and Rahul Santhanam
  • Local Algorithms for Finding Interesting Individuals in Large Networks by Mickey Brautbar and Michael Kearns
  • A New Approximation Technique for Resource-Allocation Problems by Barna Saha, Aravind Srinivasan
  • Circumventing the Price of Anarchy: Leading Dynamics to Good Behavior by Maria-Florina Balcan and Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour
  • Reaching Consensus on Social Networks by Elchanan Mossel and Grant Schoenebeck

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