WINE 2022 papers

 https://www.cs.rpi.edu/wine2022/#accepted-papers


Accepted Papers


Jad Salem, Swati Gupta and Vijay Kamble.

Algorithmic Challenges in Ensuring Fairness at the Time of Decision


Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen and Kangning Wang.

Auditing for Core Stability in Participatory Budgeting


Pinyan Lu, Enze Sun and Chenghan Zhou.

Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS Valuations


Lirong Xia and Weiqiang Zheng.

Beyond the Worst Case: Semi-Random Complexity Analysis of Winner Determination


Tim Oosterwijk, Daniel Schmand and Marc Schroder.

Bicriteria Nash Flows over Time


Xiaotie Deng, Ningyuan Li, Weian Li and Qi Qi.

Competition Among Parallel Contests


Will Ma and David Simchi-Levi.

Constructing Demand Curves from a Single Observation of Bundle Sales


Grzegorz Pierczyński and Piotr Skowron.

Core-Stable Committees under Restricted Domains


Peng Shi and Junxiong Yin.

Eliminating Waste in Cadaveric Organ Allocation


Christine Konicki, Mithun Chakraborty and Michael Wellman.

Exploiting Extensive-Form Structure in Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis


Pan Xu.

Exploring the Tradeoff between Competitive Ratio and Variance in Online-Matching Markets


Xiaohui Bei, Zihao Li and Junjie Luo.

Fair and Efficient Multi-Resource Allocation for Cloud Computing


Yumou Fei.

Improved Approximation to First-Best Gains-from-Trade


Bainian Hao and Carla Michini.

Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in series-parallel network congestion games


Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu and Xiangqian Yang.

Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification


Mengqian Zhang, Yuhao Li, Jichen Li, Chaozhe Kong and Xiaotie Deng.

Insightful Mining Equilibria


Zhibin Tan, Zhigang Cao and Zhengxing Zou.

Matrix-exact Covers of Minimum-Cost-Spanning-Tree Games


Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari and Soumyarup Sadhukhan.

Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage


Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra and Uriel Feige.

On Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations


Susanne Albers and Sebastian Schubert.

Online Ad Allocation in Bounded-Degree Graphs


Melika Abolhassani, Hossein Esfandiari, Yasamin Nazari, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng and Creighton Thomas.

Online Allocation and Display Ads Optimization with Surplus Supply


Matthew Eichhorn, Siddhartha Banerjee and David Kempe.

Online Team Formation under Different Synergies


Titing Cui and Michael Hamilton.

Optimal Feature-Based Market Segmentation and Pricing


Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer and Max Klimm.

Optimal Impartial Correspondences


Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng and Yuhao Li.

Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form Games


Nick Gravin, Hao Li and Zhihao Gavin Tang.

Optimal Prophet Inequality with Less than One Sample


Boris Epstein and Will Ma.

Order Selection Problems in Hiring Pipelines


Tong Xie and Zizhuo Wang.

Personalized Assortment Optimization under Consumer Choice Models with Local Network Effects


Sumit Goel and Wade Hann-Caruthers.

Project selection with partially verifiable information


Bo Jiang, Zizhuo Wang and Nanxi Zhang.

Revenue Management Under a Price Alert Mechanism


Adam Elmachtoub, Vineet Goyal, Roger Lederman and Harsh Sheth.

Revenue Management with Product Retirement and Customer Selection


Cuimin Ba.

Robust Model Misspecification and Paradigm Shifts


Hu Fu, Qun Hu and Jia'Nan Lin.

Stability of Queueing Networks Beyond Complete Bipartite Cases


Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Barton Lee and Toby Walsh.

Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location


Itai Feigenbaum.

Strategyproofness in Kidney Exchange with Cancellations


Atanas Dinev and S. Matthew Weinberg.

Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match


Jugal Garg, Edin Husić, Aniket Murhekar and László Végh.

Tractable Fragments of the Maximum Nash Welfare Problem


Yuan Qiu, Jinyan Liu and Di Wang.

Truthful Generalized Linear Models

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