INFORMS Workshop on Market Design 2021 (July 23-24, 2021)



Organizers

Martin Bichler, Technical University of Munich

Sasa Pekec, Duke University

Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford


Registration

To attend the workshop, please complete the registration here. There is a single registration for all virtual events associated with EC. The registration fee for those registering by July 15 is $20 for ACM SIGecom members.


PROGRAM 


Friday

All times ET, substract 3 for PT, add 5 for UK, add 6 for CET, add 14 for Australia

Each block of accepted papers has two talks: 25 for each presentation, followed by 20min devoted to parallel discussion in Gather 



9:50 am


Workshop Opening


Martin Bichler, Sasa Pekec, Alex Teytelboym

10:00-10:50 am  Invited Talk 


Tommy Andersson (Lund University)


10:50-12:00 am Session 


Dynamic Markets


Dynamic Matching under Spatial Frictions

Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School)*

Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks

Massey Cashore (Cornell University)*; Peter Frazier (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

12:00-1:10 pm Session 


Assortment


Multi-agent Assortment Optimization in Sequential Matching Markets

Margarida Carvalho (Université de Montréal); Andrea Lodi (Polytechnique Montréal); Alfredo Torrico (Polytechnique Montreal)*

When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?

Will Ma (Columbia University)*

1:10-2.00 pm  Invited Talk 


Wedad Elmaghraby (University of Maryland)


2:00-3:10 pm Session 


Mechanism Design


Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility

Francisco Castro (UCLA Anderson School of Management)*

Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms

Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford); Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University); Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)*

PROGRAM Saturday


10:00-11:10 am Session 


Object allocation


The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints

Haris Aziz (UNSW Sydney)*; Florian Brandl (Bonn University)

Undergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets

Daniel A Kornbluth (Carnegie Mellon University)*; Alexey Kushnir (Carnegie Mellon)

11:10-12.00 am  Invited Talk 


Asu Ozdaglar (MIT)


12:00-1:10 pm Session 


Market Design for Public Policy


Simple and Approximately Optimal Contract Design for Payment for Ecosystem Services

Itai Ashlagi (Stanford); Wanyi Li (Stanford University); Irene Lo (Stanford)*

School Assignment by Match Quality

Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University); Aram Grigoryan (Duke University)*; Umut Dur (North Carolina State University)

1:10-2:20 pm Session 


Matching Theory


Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange

Peter Biro (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)*; Flip Klijn (CSIC and Barcelona GSE); Xenia Klimentova (INESC TEC); Ana Viana (INESC TEC and ISEP)

The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations

John P Dickerson (University of Maryland); Samuel Dooley (University of Maryland); Marina L Knittel (University of Maryland, College Park)* 


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