Summer School on Game Theory and Social Choice June 21 - June 24 and July 9 - July 13, 2021




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Game theory and social choice are very popular research topics in the study of multi-agent systems. Being rich by themselves, they are also interacting with other research domains, generating many interesting results. 
The objective of the summer school is to provide fundamental knowledge in game theory and social choice to researchers or research students who may find the topics useful in their own research or senior undergraduate students who are looking for potential research directions. 
At the same time, the students will also have the opportunity to learn about the state of the art in these fields via keynote talks. 

The summer school is organized by Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong via zoom during June 21 - June 24 and July 9 - July 13, 2021. The intended participants of the summer school are students within computer science, or students with mathematics or economics background interested in game theory and social choice. 

Keynote Speaker List:

Tutorial Speaker List:

Keynotes and Tutorials Abstract

Registration

There will be no registration fee. 

If you get the participation information from the speakers, then you do not need to send registration details. If you learned about this summer school by other channels and would like to join, please fill in the google form by 16 June, 2021. If quota allows, we will send you the participation information before 18 June, 2021.

Organizing Committee

Sponsors

The summer school is fully sponsored by Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong

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