Workshop on Fairness, Incentives and Algorithms in Celebration of Hervé Moulin 70th Birthday

Workshop on Fairness, Incentives and Algorithms in Celebration of Hervé Moulin 70th Birthday

June 22-23, 2020, CIDE, Mexico City, Mexico

 The Internet vastly expands the opportunities for non-market decision making and resource allocation. It is now almost costless to vote on a small (doodle polls) or large scale (online petitions), to implement reliable reputation systems, fair peer-to-peer rules to divide or exchange memory space, working time, the family heirlooms, and much more.

 In this context, the search for new or improved mechanisms faces new design constraints: to the economists’ concern for their efficiency, fairness and incentive compatibility, it adds the computer science focus on the numerical evaluations of their worst-case performance, computational complexity and scalability.

 Topics addressed in this interdisciplinary workshop include, but are not limited to: Fair division, Cost-sharing, Computational Social Choice, Mechanism design on Networks, Price of Anarchy, Matching.

 The workshop will bring together researchers from the economics and computer sciences communities for two days of presentations and informal meetings, June 22-23, ahead of the 15th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in the prestigious Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City, Mexico.
Program Committee
Anna Bogomolnaia (Glasgow) Justin Leroux (HEC Montreal)
Local committee
Isabel Melguizo (CIDE)
Ruben Juarez (Hawaii) Hervé Moulin (Glasgow)
Antonio Jiménez (CIDE)
Rajnish Kumar (Belfast) Alison Watts (SIU)
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Submission Instructions:Please email your paper/extend-abstract to rubenj@hawaii.edu by February 18, 2020. Notifications of acceptance/rejection will be sent on or before February 23. We also invite you to submit any papers to the 15th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, with submission deadline February 28 (https://sscw2020.colmex.mx/)

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