Deakin Economic Theory Workshop program (5th September 2019)

DEAKIN ECONOMIC THEORY 
WORKSHOP 2019 
Date: Thursday, 5 September 2019 Location: Burwood Corporate Center 
Level 2, Building BC 221 Burwood Highway 


9:00 – 9:30 am
page1image3747145136
Reception
9:30 – 10:30 am
page1image3746221872
Keynote Speaker: William Thomson, University of Rochester
On Claims Problems
10:30 – 10:50 am
page1image3748014080
Morning Tea
10:50 – 11:20 am
page1image3748020480
Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University
Strategy-Proof and Efficient Mediation: An Ordinal Mechanism Design Approach
11:20 – 11:50 am
page1image3748037392
Duygu Yengin Erdemir, University of Adelaide
Bargaining under Eminent Domain Threat
11:50 – 1:20 pm
page1image3748049600
Lunch
1:20 – 1:50 pm
page1image3748057136
Ivan Balbuzanov, University of Melbourne
Constrained Random Matching
1:50 – 2:20 pm
page1image3748914512
Isa Hafalir, University of Technology Sydney
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment
2:20 – 2:40 pm
page1image3748069088
Afternoon Tea
2:40 – 3:10 pm
page1image3746244512
Haris Aziz, UNSW
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores
3:10 – 3:40 pm
page1image3746256400
Chiu Yu Ko, National University of Singapore
Sharing Profit by Ranking Partners
page1image3746263424
3:40 – 4:00 pm
Afternoon Tea
page1image3746270624
4:00 – 4:30 pm
Alexandru Nichifor, University of Melbourne
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices
page1image3746284624
4:30 – 5:00 pm
page1image3746289248
Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University
No-Envy, Solidarity and Strategy-Proofness in the Queueing Problem

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Smart Lotteries in School Choice Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability

Image
Working Paper: https://cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au/~haziz/PIRMES.pdf  Abstract: In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized admission mechanism is then usually obtained by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm with random tie-breaking. Therefore, every possible outcome of this mechanism is a stable solution for the coarse priorities that will arise with certain probability. This implies a probabilistic assignment, where the admission probability for each student-school pair is specified. In this paper, we propose a new efficiency-improving stable `smart lottery' mechanism. We aim to improve the probabilistic assignment ex-ante in a stochastic dominance sense, while ensuring that the improved random matching is still ex-post stable, meaning that it can be decomposed into stable matchings regarding the ...
Read more

Proportionally Representative Clustering

Image
H. Aziz, B. Lee, S. Morota Chu, and J. Vollen. Proportionally Representative Clustering.  WINE 2024 .  [  Pdf  ]  In recent years, there has been a surge in effort to formalize notions of fairness in machine learning. We focus on centroid clustering— one of the fundamental tasks in unsupervised machine learning. We pro- pose a new axiom “proportionally representative fairness” (PRF) that is designed for clustering problems where the selection of centroids re- flects the distribution of data points and how tightly they are clustered together. Our fairness concept is not satisfied by existing fair cluster- ing algorithms. We design efficient algorithms to achieve PRF both for unconstrained and discrete clustering problems. Our algorithm for the unconstrained setting is also the first known polynomial-time approxi- mation algorithm for the well-studied Proportional Fairness (PF) axiom [ 13 ]. Our algorithm for the discrete setting also matches the best kn...
Read more

Fair budgets from ranked ballots: PB-EAR

How do you split a shared budget fairly when people rank projects that cost very different amounts? PB-EAR, from our AAAI 2021 paper  Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences  ( AAAI version ), gives every voter an equal slice of the budget and lets groups pool their slices to fund the projects they rank highest, looking further down the ballots only when nothing is yet affordable. Every cohesive group is guaranteed its proportional share, and the rule extends our  Expanding Approvals Rule  for elections to budgets with project costs, ties and unequal voter weights.  That makes it a natural fit for DAO grant rounds such as   TheDAO Security Fund 's ETHSecurity Initiatives, where badge holders will rank the security initiatives listed on   the app  to allocate the fund's budget. The two-minute video below walks through a worked example. Here's an educational tool someone built to show how PB-EAR works. 
Read more