International Conference Economic Design and Algorithms in St Petersburg (July 8-9, 2019)



International Conference
Economic Design and Algorithms in St PetersburgJuly 8-9, 2019
Venue: 3A Kantemirovskaya st, St Petersburg, Russia

Day 1
​July, 8 (Room 435)
08:30 - 09:00 Registration
09:00 - 11:00 Session 1
Francis Bloch (​Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne): ​Pricing in anonymized networksPhilip Grech (​ETH Zurich): ​A posteriori power indices: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit
Moshe Babaioff (​Microsoft Research): ​Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break
11:30 - 12:50 Session 2
Arunava Sen (​Indian Statistical Institute):​​When is checking a subset of incentive-compatibility constraints sufficient for strategy-proofness? A Characterization and Applications
Fabrizio Germano (​Universitat Pompeu Fabra): ​The few-get-richer: a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings
12:50 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 Session 3
Eyal Winter (​Hebrew University of Jerusalem):​​Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors
Olga Gorelkina (​University of Liverpool Management School): ​Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions
Thomas Nedelec (​ENS Paris Saclay): ​Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctions
16:00 - 16:30 Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:50 Session 4
Jay Sethuraman (​Columbia University):​​TBA
Wolfgang Leininger (​TU Dortmund University): ​Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation

Day 2
July, 9 (Room 435)
09:00 - 11:00 Session 1
Umut Dur (​North Carolina State University): ​Family Ties: School Assignment With Siblings
Rida Laraki​(University of Paris Dauphine): ​Stable Matching with Efforts
Peter Biro (​Hungarian Academy of Sciences):​​Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:50 Session 2
Debasis Mishra​ (Indian Statistical Institute): ​Stable dissolution of a partnership
Haris Aziz (​The University of New South Wales): ​Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores
12:50 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 Session 3
Rodrigo Velez​(Texas A&M University): ​Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget
Antonio Nicolo (​University of Padua): ​Stable Sharing
Nick Gravin​(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics): ​Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare
16:00 - 16:30 Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:50 Session 4
Yu Zhou (​Waseda University): ​Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints
Katharina Huesmann (​University of Cologne):​​Public Assignment of Scarce Resources under Income Effects
19:00 Conference Dinner

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