EXPLORE-2015: The 2nd Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice

The website of EXPLORE 2015 is now up!

Main information:

EXPLORE-2015: The 2nd Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice

To be held at the 14th Conference for Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS 2015.

May 4-8, 2015

Istanbul, Turkey


Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) is a rapidly developing field at the intersection of computer science, economics, social choice, and political science. Many, often disjoint, groups of researchers both outside and within computer science study group decision making and preference aggregation. The computer science view of social choice focuses on computational aspects of social choice and importing ideas from social choice into computer science, broadly. While the surge of research in this area has created dramatic benefits in the areas of market matchings, recommendation systems, and preference aggregation, much of the ComSoc community remains focused on worst case assumptions.

As ComSoc evolves in the coming years there will be an increased need to relax or revise some of the more common assumptions in the field: worst case complexity, complete information, and overly-restricted domains, among others. This means going beyond traditional algorithmic and complexity results and providing a more nuanced look, using real-data, parametrized algorithms, and human and agent experimentation to provide a fresh and impactful view of group decision making. This goes hand in hand with highlighting the practical applications of much of the theoretical research — as much of the most impactful work in ComSoc does. It also involves looking at more complex preference aggregation settings that help model real world requirements.

We encourage research related to:

Algorithms
Empirical Studies
Average case analysis
Identification of tractable sub-cases
Fixed parameter complexity analysis
Benchmarking and analysis from the preference handling and recommendation systems
Studies of matching and auction mechanisms
Crowd-sourcing and other real-world data aggregation domains.

Many of these tools, techniques, and studies are concentrated in a particular sub-field and researchers in other areas of ComSoc and related communities may be keen to import some of the tools and techniques developed in other areas.



Program Notes
------------------------------

The workshop is currently scheduled for 1/2 a day (though this may change based on the number and quality of submissions).  The program will include a mini-tutorial (1 hour) which will focus on practical and/or theoretical aspects of moving beyond the worst case in computational social choice.


Important Dates
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Paper Submission Deadline: February 5, 2014

Author Notification: March 1, 2014

Conference and Workshop: May 4-8, 2014


Organization Committee
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Haris Aziz, NICTA and UNSW

Nicholas Mattei, NICTA and UNSW

Nina Narodytska, Carnegie Mellon University.



Submission Instructions
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Submissions will be handled by EasyChair, the site is available at https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=explore2015.

Papers should be in AAMAS format, allowing 8 pages of text plus 1 page for references.



Travel and Attendance Information
-----------------------------------

The workshop will be held in conjunction with AAMAS 2015 in Istanbul, Turkey.
Please see the AAMAS website for more information regarding registration,
travel, and accommodations: http://www.aamas2015.com.


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