Schedule of WINE 2014


[Taken from http://wine2014.amss.ac.cn/dct/page/70014]


December 14:
Location of Conference Venue: South Building of AMSS
9:00am‐17:00pm: Registration (Location:the 2nd floor near N204)

10:00am‐12:00pm: Tutorial
Nir Gavish.
Computation of equilibrium bidding strategies in asymmetric first price auctions. (Location: N204)
1:30‐3:30pm: Tutorial (Location: N204) Kamal Jain.
Theoretical Analysis of Business Models.
3:30‐4:00pm: Coffee break
4:00‐6:00pm: Tutorial (Location: N204)
Martin Gairing.
Quantifying the Efficiency of Congestion Games
6:00pm: End of Tutorials day. 


December 15:
8:00am‐12:00am: Registration (Location:the 2nd floor near N204) 8:50‐9:00am: Opening (Location: N204)
9:00am: Invited Talk by Robert Aumann
10:00am: Coffee Break
10:30am: Session 1 (Location: N204)
10:30‐10:54:Shaddin Dughmi, Li Han and Noam Nisan. Sampling and
Representation Complexity of RevenueMaximization
10:54‐11:18:Qiang Zhang, Stefano Leonardi, Riccardo Colini Baldeschi and Piotr Sankowski. Revenue Maximizing Envy‐free Fixed‐price Auctions with Budgets
11:18‐11:42: MuntherDahleh, John Tsitsiklis and Spyros Zoumpoulis. The
Value of Temporally Richer Data for Learning of Influence Networks 11:42‐12:06: Yash Kanoria and Hamid Nazerzadeh. Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids
12:06‐12:30: Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan and Adrian Vetta. Bounds on the Profitability of a Durable Good Monopolist
12:30pm: Buffet Lunch (Location:the 3rd floor at Wuke Hotel; A ticket is needed) 2:00pm: Invited Talk by Noam Nisan (Location: N204)
3:00pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm: Session 2 (Location: N204)
3:30‐3:54:Nicolas Bousquet, Sergey Norin and Adrian Vetta. A Near‐Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection
3:54‐4:18:JarosławByrka and Krzysztof Sornat. PTAS for Minimax Approval Voting
4:18‐4:42:ArisFilos‐Ratsikas and Peter Bro Miltersen. Truthful Approximations to Range Voting
4:42‐5:06:Haris Aziz and Chun Ye. Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations
5:06‐5:30:Yiling Chen, Or Sheffet and SalilVadhan. Privacy Games
5:30‐5:54: Rad Niazadeh, Yang Yuan and Robert Kleinberg. Simple and Near‐
Optimal Mechanisms for Market Intermediation
7:00pm: Banquet andfolk music performance with traditional Chinese instruments (Location: Chao Fu Gong at the 2nd floor of Jade Palace Hotel; A ticket is needed)
9:00pm: End of Day 


December 16:
8:20am: Registration and Coffee (Location: 2nd floor of South Bld.) 8:50am: Announcement on WINE’15 (Location: N204)
9:00am: Invited Talk by Andrew Yao (Location: N204)
10:00am: Coffee Break
10:30am: Session 1 (Location: N204)
10:30‐10:54:Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias and Tim Roughgarden.
Optimal Cost‐Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games
10:54‐11:18:Matthias Feldotto, Martin Gairing and Alexander Skopalik.
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
11:18‐11:42: Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Britta Peis. Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids
11:42‐12:06: SmritiBhagat, Anthony Kim, S. Muthukrishnan and Udi Weinsberg. The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games
12:06‐12:30: ArgyriosDeligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani and Paul Spirakis.
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games
12:30pm: Lunch (Location:the 4th floor at Wuke Hotel; A ticket is needed) 2:00pm: Invited Talk by Christos Papadimitriou(Location: N204)
3:00pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm: Session 2 (Location: N204)
3:30‐3:54:Hau Chan and Jing Chen. Truthful Multi‐unit Procurements with Budgets
3:54‐4:18:Dennis Kraft, Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler. Fast Convex Decomposition for Truthful Social Welfare Approximation
4:18‐4:42:Maria‐FlorinaBalcan, Amit Daniely, Ruta Mehta, Ruth Urner and Vijay V. Vazirani. Learning economic parameters from revealed preferences
4:42‐5:06:Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler. A Truthful‐in‐expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem
5:06‐5:30:Rafael Frongillo and Ian Kash. General Truthfulness Characterizations Via Convex Analysis
5:30pm:Short Break and WINE Business Meeting (Location: N204)
6:30pm: Poster Session/Reception (Location:the 2nd floor in the opposite of the lifts) 9:30pm: End of Day 


December 17:
8:30am: Registration and Coffee (Location: 2nd floor of South Bld.) 9:00am: Invited Talk by Xiaotie Deng (Location: N204)
10:00am: Coffee Break
10:30am: Session 1 (Location: N204)
10:30‐10:54: Ruggiero Cavallo and Christopher Wilkens. GSP with General Independent Click‐Through Rates
10:54‐11:18: Gagan Aggarwal, Yang Cai, Aranyak Mehta and George Pierrakos. Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching
11:18‐11:42: GaganGoel, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Mohammad Reza Khani. Randomized Revenue Monotone Mechanisms for Online Advertising
11:42‐12:06: Arash Asadpour, Mohammadhossein Bateni, Kshipra Bhawalkar and VahabMirrokni. Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget Constraints
12:06‐12:30: Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Seeman. Not Just an Empty Threat: Subgame‐Perfect Equilibrium in Repeated Games Played by Computationally Bounded Players
12:30pm: Lunch (Location: the 4th floor at Wuke Hotel; A ticket is needed) 2:00pm: Invited Talk by Peng Ye (Location: N204)
3:00pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm: Session 2 (Location: N204)
3:30‐3:54: LuděkCigler, Wolfgang Dvořák, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities
3:54‐4:18: Edith Elkind. Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks
4:18‐4:42: MohammadtaghiHajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, AnshulSawant, Mohammadhossein Bateni and MelikaAbolhassani. Network Cournot Competition
4:42‐5:06:KameshMunagala and Xiaoming Xu. Value‐based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design
5:06‐5:30: Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner. Matching Dynamics with Constraints
5:30‐5:54: Nithum Thain, Adrian Vetta, Ruta Mehta and Laszlo Vegh. To Save or Not To Save: The Fisher Game
6:00pm: End of Day and WINE2014

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