ESEI / UTS Center for Market Design Conference in honor of John Ledyard: 24-25 July 2014

Location: Room B424, Level 4, ‘B Block’, UTS Business School 1-59 Quay Street, Haymarket, Sydney, Australia

July 24, 2014 

 (9am - 4:30pm)

Roy Green, Dean of the UTS Business School.Welcome

John Ledyard (California Institute of Technology)
“A Simple Buy‐back Auction for Fisheries Management” with Guillerme Freitas and Theodore Groves 

 Leslie M. Marx (Duke University)
“Equilibrium Bid Strategies in an Auction with Bidder Preferences and Resale”
with Simon Loertscher

Jun Zhang (University of Technology, Sydney)
“Information Disclosure In Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach” with Junjie Zhou

Murali Agastya (University of Sydney)
“On Efficient Partnership Dissolution” with Oleksii Birulin

Paul Pezanis‐Christou (University of Adelaide)
 “Supply information policies in sequential and simultaneous high‐bid auctions”
with Nobuyuki Hanaki and Tibor Neugebaeur

Tom Wilkening (University of Melbourne)
“A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers” with Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx

Antonio Rosato (University of Technology, Sydney)
“Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the “Afternoon Effect"




July 25, 2014 

 (9am - 4:30pm)

Peter Bossaerts (University of Melbourne)
“Human‐Robot Interaction In A Classical Experiment On Multi‐Period Asset Pricing” with Elena Asparouhova

Robert Slonim (University of Sydney)
“Improving Blood Donations: A Summary of 6 Papers” with Ashley Craig, Ellen Garbarino, Stephanie Heger, Victor Iajya, Mario Macis, Nicola Lacetera and Carmen Wang.

Haris Aziz (NICTA and UNSW)
“Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations” with Chun Ye

Andy McLennan (University of Queensland)
“On Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Kyle Model” with Paulo Klinger Monteiro and Rabee Tourky

Claudio Mezzetti (University of Melbourne)
“Repeated Nash Implementation” with Ludovic Renou  

 Juan Carlos, Carbajal (University of New South Wales)
“Plasticity, Monotonicity, and Implementability” with Rudolf Müller
 
Priscilla Man (University of Queensland)
“Generalized Majority Rules” with Marco Faravelli

 

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