Handbook on Market Design

The Handbook on Market Design edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman is about to be published by Cambridge University Press.

The book has major sections on matching markets and auctions.

Alvin E. Roth, Nir Vulkan, and Zvika Neeman: Introduction
Part I: General Principles
1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
Part II: Cases
Section II.A: Matching Markets
4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?
8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
10: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
Section II.B: Auctions
11: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
12: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
13: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
Section II.C: E Commerce
14: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
15: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing
17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith
Section II.D: Law Design
18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
Part III: Experiments
20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments
23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
Part IV: Competing Designs
24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets


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