AAMAS 2013

AAMAS 2013 : Twelfth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
St Paul
6-10 May 2013
http://aamas2013.cs.umn.edu/

AAMAS was located in St. Paul, USA this year. Toby (Walsh) and I were the two participants from NICTA.

The first two days were dedicated to co-located workshops and tutorials. Along with Edith Elkind (NTU Singapore) and Michael Wooldridge (Oxford), I co-organized the fourth edition the International workshop on cooperative aspects of multiagent systems (CoopMAS). We had four sessions of interesting talks including an invited talk by Thomasz Michalak in which he discussed the applications of cooperative game theory to gauge the centrality of nodes in a network.

On the second day, I attended a number of talks from the workshop of OptMAS (Optimization in Multiagent Systems).

The main conference started on the 8th. Among the invited speakers, Barbara J. Grosz (Harvard) and Cristiano Castelfranchi (Inst. of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italy) gave entertaining talks on the challenges and directions for AI. I was especially looking forward to the invited talk by Jeffrey S. Rosenschein but he could not make it to the conference due to unavoidable circumstances.

I mostly attended sessions on game theory and social choice. Both fields have become firmly established in the multi-agent systems community. The conference provided a good opportunity to initiate projects or bounce back ideas with fellow researchers in algorithmic economics. NICTA had co-authors on the following papers all of which were presented in the game theory or social choice sessions. 
The session which I particularly enjoyed was the final game theory session which focused  on resource allocation and cake cutting. In the session, one paper that caught my attention was the following one:
No Agent Left Behind: Dynamic Fair Division of Multiple Resources by Ian Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia and Nisarg Shah.

The paper extends a recently developed strategy-proof and envy-free algorithm for allocating computer resources to agents with “Leontief” preferences.

The paper on "Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods" by Piotr Krysta Orestis Telelis and Carmine Ventre received the best paper award.

The proceedings of AAMAS 2013 are already available.

The next edition of the conference will be held in Paris!

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