ACM EC 2013

The accepted paper list is now public:


  • Designing for Diversity in Matching, Scott D Kominers and Tayfun Sonmez
  • Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd", Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour and Motty Perry
  • Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective, Yoav Wilf and Michal Feldman
  • The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions, Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan
  • Differential Pricing with inequity aversion in social networks, Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Social Learning and Aggregate Network Uncertainty, Ilan Lobel and Evan Sadler
  • Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method, Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala
  • Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers, Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim and Berthold Voecking
  • Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy, Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian Kash, Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan
  • Complex Contagion and The Weakness of Long Ties in Social Networks: Revisited, Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh and Jie Gao 
  • Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents, Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy
  • Optimizing Password Composition Policies, Jeremiah MBlocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel Procaccia and Or Sheffet
  • Potential games are necessary to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games, Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason Marden and Adam Wierman
  • Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents, Nikhil R Devanur, Bach Ha and Jason Hartline
  • Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders, Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan, Kulkarni Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden and Xiaoming Xu
  • A Network Approach to Public Goods, Matt Elliott and Ben Golub
  • Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information, Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff and Michael Grubb 
  • Learning Equilibria of Games via Payoff Queries, Rahul Savani, John Fearnley, Martin Gairing and Paul Goldberg
  • Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problem, Rodrigo Velez
  • A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Jose Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego and Vineet Goyal
  • Super Efficient Rational Proofs, Pablo Azar and Silvio Micali
  • Improved Bounds on the Price of Stability in Network Cost Sharing Games, Euiwoong Lee and Katrina Ligett
  • Real-time Optimization of Personalized Assortments, Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Paat Rusmevichientong
  • Bertrand Networks, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan
  • Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous Pools, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi
  • Selection and Influence in Cultural Dynamics, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens
  • Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions, Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian Kash and Peter Key
  • Harnessing the Power of Two Crossmatches, Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel Procaccia and Ankit Sharma 
  • When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?, Ioannis Caragiannis Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah
  • Incentives, gamification, and game theory: An economic approach to badge design, David Easley and Arpita Ghosh 
  • Auctions with Unique Equilibria, Shuchi Chawla and Jason Hartline
  • Competition Among Asymmetric Sellers With Fixed Supply, Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • On Discrete Preferences and Coordination, Flavio Chierichetti, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren
  • House Allocation with Indifferences: A generalization and a unified view, Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
  • An Axiomatic Characterization of Adaptive-Liquidity Market Maker, Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan 
  • Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
  • Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model, Elaine Wah and Michael Wellman
  • Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty, Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova and Jeff S. Shamma
  • Existence of Stable Matchings in Large Markets with Complementarities, Eduardo Azevedo and John Hatfield
  • Approximation in Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Yunan Li
  • Loss Calibarated Methods for Bipartite Rationing Problems, Herve Moulin and Jay Sethuraman
  • Mechanism Design for Fair Division: Allocating Divisible Items without Payments, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Gagan Goel
  • Budget Smoothing in Internet Ad Auctions: a Game Theoretic approach, Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R Devanur and Lei Wang 
  • On the Ratio of Revenue to Welfare in Single-Parameter Mechanism Design, Robert Kleinberg and Yang Yuan
  • Privacy and coordination: Computing on databases with endogenous participation, Arpita Ghosh and Katrina Ligett
  • Human-Agent Based Models of Cooperation in Public Goods Games, Michael Wunder, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts
  • Incentivizing participation in online forums for education, Arpita Ghosh and Jon Kleinberg
  • Sybil-proof Mechanisms in Query Incentive Networks, Wei Chen, Wang Yajun, Dongxiao Yu and Li Zhang
  • The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games, Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman
  • Which side chooses in large random matching markets?, Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria and Jacob Leshno
  • Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis 
  • What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act - Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets, Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen
  • Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport, Costis Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
  • Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale, Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme
  • Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions, Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos
  • Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange, John Dickerson, Ariel Procaccia and Tuomas Sandholm
  • Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions, Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Weintraub
  • Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker", Eric Budish and Aditya Bhave
  • Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions, Brandon Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald and Michael Wellman 
  • Down-to-the-Minute Effects of Super Bowl Advertising on Online Search Behavior, Randall A Lewis and David Reiley
  • A Combinatorial Prediction Market for the U.S. Elections, Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie, David Pennock and David Rothschild
  • Multi-parameter Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders, Nikhil R Devanur, Nitish Korula, Zhiyi Huang, Vahab Mirrokni and Qiqi Yan
  • The Virality--Efficiency Tradeoff, Sean J Taylor, Eytan Bakshy and Sinan Aral
  • Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition, Gabriel Carroll
  • Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • Two-sided Matching with Partial Information, Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica and Kevin Leyton-Brown 
  • Cost Function Market Makers for Measurable Spaces, Yiling Chen, Michael Ruberry and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
  • Best-Response Dynamics Out of Sync: Complexity and Characterization, Roee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira and David Wajc
  • Pick Your Poison: Pricing and Inventories at Unlicensed Online Pharmacies, Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin
  • The Truth Behind the Myth of the Folk Theorem, Seeman Lior, Rafael Pass and Joseph Halpern
  • Revenue Optimization in the Generalized Second-Price Auction, David Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown

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