Match UP 2012 Accepted Papers

Paper list:


Format A papers
Haris Aziz, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein. Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences

Rashid Farooq, Tamas Fleiner and Akihisa Tamura. Matching with partially ordered contracts

Endre Boros, Liliya Fedzhora, Vladimir Gurvich and Steven Jaslar. On rank-profiles of stable matchings

Chien-Chung Huang and Telikepalli Kavitha. Weight-Maximal Matchings

Alexander Teytelboym. Strong stability in contractual networks and matching markets

James Boudreau. An exploration into why some matchings are more likely than others

Christine Cheng and Eric McDermid. Maximum Locally Stable Matchings

Zoltán Király. Linear time local approximation algorithm for maximum stable marriage

Agnes Cseh, Jannik Matuschke and Martin Skutella. Stable Flows over Time

Daniel Ayala, Ouri Wolfson, Bo Xu, Bhaskar Dasgupta and Jie Lin. Stability of Marriage and Vehicular Parking
Format B papers
Gagan Goel and Pushkar Tripathi. Matching with our Eyes Closed

Eduardo Azevedo and Jacob Leshno. A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-sided Matching Markets

Jacob Leshno. Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems

Songzi Du and Yair Livne. Unraveling and Chaos in Matching Markets

Guillaume Haeringer and Vincent Iehlé. Two-sided Matching with One-Sided Data

Ozgun Ekici and Onur Kesten. An Equilibrium Analysis of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism

Thayer Morrill. A Simple Variation of Top Trading Cycles

Pavlos Eirinakis, Dimitrios Magos, Ioannis Mourtos and Panayiotis Miliotis. On the structural characteristics of the Stable Marriage polytope

Dimitrios Michail. An Experimental Comparison of Single-Sided Preference Matching Algorithms

Umut Dur and Utku Unver. Tuition Exchange

Kristiaan Glorie, Albert Wagelmans, Marry de Klerk, Joris van de Klundert, Willij Zuidema, Frans Claas and Willem Weimar. Optimal Policy for Participation of Non-Directed Living Donors in Kidney Exchange Programs

Peter Biro, Matthijs Bomhoff, Petr Golovach, Walter Kern and Daniel Paulusma. Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments

David Manlove and Gregg O'Malley. Paired and Altruistic Kidney Donation in the UK: Algorithms and Experimentation

Katarzyna Paluch. Faster and simpler approximation of stable matchings

Szilvia Papai. Hedonic Coalition Formation and Individual Preferences

Fredrik Jansson, Kimmo Eriksson and Thomas Vetander. The Assignment Game with Negative Externalities and Bounded Rationality

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