CoopMAS 2012

FYI: 


The Third Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems                        (CoopMAS-2012)

           http://staff.science.uva.nl/~stephane/coopmas12/

                 Workshop co-located with AAMAS-2012
                           Valencia, Spain
                        June 4th or 5th, 2012

**Key dates**

 * Submission of contributions: February 28th 2012
 * Acceptance notification: March 27th 2012
 * Workshop: June 4th or 5th, 2012

*Submission Instructions*

Submission must follow the Springer LNCS format and should be a maximum of 15 pages.

Papers must be submitted in PDF through easychair:
http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=coopmas2012

*Aims and Focus*

The use of cooperative game theory to study how agents should cooperate and collaborate, along with the related topic of coalition formation, has received growing attention from the multiagent systems, game theory, and electronic commerce communities.

The workshop is intended to focus on topics in cooperation in multi-agent systems, cooperative game theory and cooperative solution concepts, formation of coalitions, negotiation between agents, joint decision making, and voting. We encourage submission of papers describing original or recently published work (in venues that are not typically attended by AAMAS participants, i.e., conferences other than AAMAS/AAAI/IJCAI). We also encourage submission of full version of short papers accepted at AAMAS. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

 * Cooperative game theory
 * Coalition formation
 * Joint decision making and voting
 * Representation issues
 * Negotiation
 * Collaborative filtering
 * Market and economics based cooperation
 * Interact with humans (negotiation / collaboration)

The workshop should be of interest to researchers in cooperative game theory and coalition formation, as well as to those who examine collaboration between agents, cooperation in multiagent systems and design and implement collaborating agents. We also welcome participants who are interested in applications of cooperative game theory, which include trading agents, sponsored search and recommender systems.

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