AAAI accepted papers on multiagent systems

(List from here)

210: Nonmanipulable Randomized Tournament Selections
 Alon Altman, Robert Kleinberg

333: Competing Schedulers
 Itai Ashlagi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar

145: Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination
Yoram Bachrach, Nadja Betzler, Piotr Faliszewski

146: Coalitional Structure Generation in Skill Games
 Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Kyomin Jung, Pushmeet Kohli

235: Transferable Utility Planning Games
Ronen I. Brafman, Carmel Domshlak, Yagil Engel, Moshe Tennenholtz

249: Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra

972: Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts
Mickey Brautbar, Michael Kearns, Umar Syed

581: An Approximate Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Computation Technique for Repeated Games
Andriy Burkov, Brahim Chaib-draa

75: Approximation Algorithms and Mechanism Design for Minimax Approval Voting
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos Markakis

23: Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication
Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia

746: A Distributed Algorithm for Optimising over Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Archie C. Chapman, Alessandro Farinelli, Enrique Munoz de Cote, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings

39: Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting
Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia

192: Possible Winners When New Candidates Are Added: The Case of Scoring Rules
Yann Chevaleyre, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Jérôme Monnot

177: Cloning in Elections
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko

521: Good Rationalizations of Voting Rules
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko

631: Lifting Rationality Assumptions in Binary Aggregation
Umberto Grandi, Ulle Endriss

606: Intentions in Equilibrium
John Grant, Sarit Kraus, Michael Wooldridge

212: Security Games with Arbitrary Schedules: A Branch and Price Approach
Manish Jain, Erim Kardes, Christopher Kiekintveld, Milind Tambe, Fernando Ordóñez

119: Algorithms for Finding Approximate Formations in Games
Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman

682: Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games
Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr

885: Stability and Incentive Compatibility in a Kernel-Based Combinatorial Auction
Sébastien Lahaie

360: Facilitating the Evaluation of Automated Negotiators Using Peer Designed Agents
Raz Lin, Sarit Kraus, Yinon Oshrat, Ya'akov (Kobi) Gal

188: Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting
Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Nicholas R. Jennings

205: Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm

30: Can Approximation Circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite?
Ariel D. Procaccia

773: Trust Models and Con-Man Agents: From Mathematical to Empirical Analysis
Amirali Salehi-Abari, Tony White

617: Increasing Threshold Search for Best-Valued Agents
David Sarne, Simon Shamoun, Eli Rata

196: Approximate Coalition Structure Generation
Travis C. Service, Julie A. Adams

780: Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems
Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes

916: Asymmetric Spite in Auctions
Ankit Sharma, Tuomas Sandholm

732: A Decentralised Coordination Algorithm for Mobile Sensors
Ruben Stranders, Francesco Maria Delle Fave, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings

151: Urban Security: Game-Theoretic Resource Allocation in Networked Physical Domains
Jason Tsai, Zhengyu Yin, Jun-young Kwak, David Kempe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Milind Tambe

852: Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions
William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George Nemhauser, David C. Parkes

642: Fixing a Tournament
Virginia Vassilevska Williams

950: Beyond Equilibrium: Predicting Human Behavior in Normal Form Games
James R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown

149: Trial-Based Dynamic Programming for Multi-Agent Planning
Feng Wu, Shlomo Zilberstein, Xiaoping Chen

434: Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer

435: Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer

195: Multi-Agent Learning with Policy Prediction
Chongjie Zhang, Victor Lesser

455: Dynamic Auction: A Tractable Auction Procedure
Dongmo Zhang, Wei Huang, Laurent Perrussel

525: Sequential Incremental-Value Auctions
Xiaoming Zheng, Sven Koenig

1084: Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money
James Zou, Sujit Gujar, David Parkes

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