ICALP accepted papers

ICALP accepted paper list is now public: http://icalp10.inria.fr/index.php?n=Main.AcceptedPapers. Some papers which caught my eyes were:

Nikhil Bansal and Subhash Khot. Inapproximability of Hypergraph Vertex Cover and Applications to Scheduling Problems

MohammadHossein Bateni, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Nicole Immorlica and Hamid Mahini. The cooperative game theory foundations of network bargaining games

Jian Li, Ke Yi and Qin Zhang. Clustering with Diversity

Tobias Harks and Max Klimm. On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games

Anupam Gupta, Viswanath Nagarajan and R Ravi. Thresholded Covering Algorithms for Robust and Max-Min Optimization

Allan Borodin and Brendan Lucier. On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

Loukas Georgiadis. Testing $2$-vertex connectivity and computing pairs of vertex-disjoint $s$-$t$ paths in digraphs

T-H. Hubert Chan, Elaine Shi and Dawn Song. Private and Continual Release of Statistics

Giorgos Christodoulou, Katrina Ligett and Evangelia Pyrga. Contention Resolution under Selfishness

John Fearnley. Exponential Lower Bounds For Policy Iteration

Dan Alistarh, Seth Gilbert, Rachid Guerraoui and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. How Efficient Can Gossip Be? (On the Message Complexity of Resilient Information Exchange)

Anna Blasiak and Robert Kleinberg. The Serializability of Network Codes

Nikhil Bansal, Kamal Jain, Anna Kazeykina and Joseph (Seffi) Naor. Approximation Algorithms for Diversified Search Ranking

Ning Chen and Xiaotie Deng. Envy-Free Pricing in Multi-Item Markets

Arend Rensink. Compositionality in Graph Transformation

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