ACM EC 2010 accepted papers

ACM EC 2010 accepted papers:
  • M. Babaioff, R. Kleinberg and A. Slivkins, Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation
  • G. Parker and M. Van Alstyne, Platforms for Controlling Downstream Innovation
  • D. Fleder, K. Hosanagar and A.Buja, Recommender Systems and their Effects on Consumers: The Fragmentation Debate
  • J. Feldman, V. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan and M. M Pai, Auctions with Intermediaries
  • S. Seuken, D. Charles, M. Chickering and S. Puri, Market Design and Analysis for a P2P Backup System
  • J. Horton and L. Chilton, The Labor Economics of Paid Crowdsourcing
  • L. Jian and R. Sami, Aggregation and Manipulation in Prediction Markets: Effects of Trading Mechanism and Information Distribution
  • S. Das and M. Magdon-Ismail, Collective Wisdom: Information Growth in Wikis and Blogs
  • T. Chakraborty, S. Judd, M. Kearns and J. Tan, A Behavioral Study of Bargaining in Social Networks
  • M. Babaioff, L. Blumrosen and A. Roth, Auctions with Online Supply
  • K. Iyer, R. Johari and C. Moallemi, Information Aggregation in Smooth Markets
  • C. Ryan, A. Xin Jiang and K. Leyton-Brown, Computing pure strategy Nash equilibria in compact symmetric games
  • L. Xia, V. Conitzer and A. D. Procaccia, A Scheduling Approach to Coalitional Manipulation
  • N. Immorlica, B. Lucier and B. Rogers, Emergence of Cooperation in Anonymous Social Networks through Social Capital
  • P. Lu, X. Sun, Y. Wang and Z. Allen Zhu, Asymptotically Optimal Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Two-Facility Games
  • D. Charles, M.Chickering, N. Devanur, K. Jain and Manan Sanghi, Matchings in Lopsided Bipartite Graphs with Applications to Display Ads
  • P. Dhangwatnotai, T. Roughgarden and Q. Yan, Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample
  • A. Bhalgat, T. Chakraborty and S. Khanna, Approximating Pure Nash Equilibrium in Cut Party Affiliation and Satisfiability Games
  • S. Chawla, D. Malec and B. Sivan, The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
  • S. Dimitrov and R. Sami, Composition of Markets with Conflicting Incentives
  • A. Othman, D. Pennock, D. Reeves and T. Sandholm, A Practical Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Maker
  • M. Sundararajan and Q. Yan, Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers
  • P. Jordan, G. Balakrishnan and M. Wellman, Strategy and Mechanism Lessons from the First Ad Auctions Trading Agent Competition
  • I. Ashlagi, I. Kash, F. Fischer and A. Procaccia, Mix and Match
  • S. Goel, D. Reeves, D. Watts and D. Pennock, Prediction Without Markets
  • J. Hatfield and S. Kominers, Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
  • L. Goldberg, P. W. Goldberg, P. Krysta and C. Ventre, Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies
  • A. Othman and T. Sandholm, Automated Market-Making in the Large: The Gates Hillman Prediction Market
  • J. Byers, M. Mitzenmacher and G. Zervas, Information Asymmetries in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions
  • A. Kalai and E. Kalai, Cooperation and Competition in Strategic Games with Private Information
  • M. Bichler, P. Shabalin and G. Ziegler, Efficiency with Linear Prices? A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of the CC Auction
  • D. Buchfuhrer, M. Schapira and Y. Singer, Computation and Incentives in Combinatorial Public Projects
  • P. Chen, M. David and D. Kempe, Better Vaccination Strategies for Better People
  • T. Lu and C. Boutilier, The Unavailable Candidate Model: A Decision-Theoretic View of Social Choice
  • D. Braziunas and C. Boutilier, Assessing Regret-based Preference Elicitation with the UTPref Recommendation System
  • R. Johari and S. Kumar, Congestible Services and Network Effects
  • S. Dughmi and A. Ghosh, Truthful Assignment without Money
  • Y. Desmedt and E. Elkind, Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstentions
  • J. Letchford and V. Conitzer, Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Extensive-Form Games
  • I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, N. Karanikolas and A. Procaccia, Socially Desirable Approximations for Dodgson's Voting Rule
  • Y. Chen and J. Wortman Vaughan, A New Understanding of Prediction Markets Via No-Regret Learning
  • J. Feigenbaum, A. Jaggard and M. Schapira, Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification
  • E. Vee, S. Vassilvitskii and J. Shanmugasundaram, Optimal Online Assignment with Forecasts
  • E. Cohen, M. Feldman, A. Fiat, H. Kaplan and Svetlana Olonetsky, Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
  • D. Reiley, S. Li and R. Lewis, Northern Exposure: A Field Experiment Measuring Externalities between Search Advertisements

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