SAGT accepted papers

The list of accepted papers:


Leah Epstein and Asaf Levin.

On equilibria for ADM minimization games


Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan.

A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem

Andre Berger, Rudolf Müller and Seyed Hossein Naeemi.

Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations


Clemens Thielen and Sven Krumke.

Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents


Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz.

Partition Equilibrium

Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm.

Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms


Jose Correa and Nicolas Figueroa.

On the planner’s loss due to lack of information in Bayesian mechanism design


Krzysztof Apt and Arantza Estevez-Fernandez.

Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems


Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Rolf H. Moehring.

Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games


Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan.

Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency


Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Joerg Rothe and Jeffrey Rosenschein.

The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games


Kim Thang Nguyen and Christoph Dürr.

Non-Clairvoyant Scheduling Games

Hyunwoo Jung and Kyung-Yong Chwa.

The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds


Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das and Yonatan Naamad.

Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings


Elliot Anshelevich and Satish Ukkusuri.

Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing


Christine Chung and Evangelia Pyrga.

Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games


Tanmoy Chakraborty and Sanjeev Khanna.

Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games


Elliot Anshelevich and Bugra Caskurlu.

Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design


Andrew Byde, Maria Polukarov and Nicholas Jennings.

Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities


Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman and Guy Wolfovitz.

A Perfect Auction Derandomization

Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Jan Hoffmann.

The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles


Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala.

Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To


Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich and Alexander Skopalik.

Doing Good with Spam is Hard


Rajiv Raman, Khaled Elbassioni, Saurabh Ray and Rene Sitters.

On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems.


Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein.

On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games


Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko.

Swap Bribery

Vittorio Bilo', Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini and Luca Moscardelli.

Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games

Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella.

Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows Over Time


Po-An Chen and David Kempe.

Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes

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