VPP 2009

I am reproducing an extract from the VPP 2009 workshop which will be held at Warwick next month :
--------

Voting Power in Practice Summer Workshop
Developing Governance Models of Corporate
and Intergovernmental Institutions with Shareholder Voting
14 - 16 July 2009
Scarman House, University of Warwick

We would like to invite participation of both academic researchers, with either theoretical or applied interests, and practitioners working on corporate governance, from government, financial regulation, investment management and NGOs. Academics will gain a deeper practical understanding and practitioners will benefit from contact with the theoretical preoccupations of academic researchers in their shared fields. We hope that there will be participants from diverse disciplinary backgrounds and with different interests including political science, economics, game theory and other branches of mathematics, public choice, social choice and voting procedures, as well as practitioners and their advisers from outside academia. Overall, we hope that the workshop will encourage dialogue and promote understanding between academics and policy makers in the field as well as promoting crossdisciplinary research.

The scope of the workshop will include both joint stock companies and intergovernmental institutions such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and some institutions of the European Union. The unifying feature is that all these institutions employ systems of weighted voting by members – shareholders in the case of joint stock corporations – and ideas of voting power and corporate control are central.

While papers are invited on all aspects of voting power analysis – methodological, technical and applied – we particularly wish to encourage papers in all areas of application presented by practitioners with particular emphasis on policy relevance and case studies. The key ingredient of the workshop is the promotion of interactivity between the diverse community of ractitioners and the voting power theorists. To maximise communication between all parties, all presentations should be jargon-free and keyed to the level of a highly motivated non-specialist. Papers on any of the following questions are sought, but those dealing with other relevant topics are also welcome.

• Why are shareholders not more active?
• How many shareholder votes are needed in practice for company control through
voting at AGMs?
• Voting power and shareholder concentration.
• What are shareholders voting about? Epistemic versus procedural perspectives: voting
as discovering the best strategy versus voting about shareholders’ preferences.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Smart Lotteries in School Choice Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability

Image
Working Paper: https://cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au/~haziz/PIRMES.pdf  Abstract: In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized admission mechanism is then usually obtained by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm with random tie-breaking. Therefore, every possible outcome of this mechanism is a stable solution for the coarse priorities that will arise with certain probability. This implies a probabilistic assignment, where the admission probability for each student-school pair is specified. In this paper, we propose a new efficiency-improving stable `smart lottery' mechanism. We aim to improve the probabilistic assignment ex-ante in a stochastic dominance sense, while ensuring that the improved random matching is still ex-post stable, meaning that it can be decomposed into stable matchings regarding the ...
Read more

Proportionally Representative Clustering

Image
H. Aziz, B. Lee, S. Morota Chu, and J. Vollen. Proportionally Representative Clustering.  WINE 2024 .  [  Pdf  ]  In recent years, there has been a surge in effort to formalize notions of fairness in machine learning. We focus on centroid clustering— one of the fundamental tasks in unsupervised machine learning. We pro- pose a new axiom “proportionally representative fairness” (PRF) that is designed for clustering problems where the selection of centroids re- flects the distribution of data points and how tightly they are clustered together. Our fairness concept is not satisfied by existing fair cluster- ing algorithms. We design efficient algorithms to achieve PRF both for unconstrained and discrete clustering problems. Our algorithm for the unconstrained setting is also the first known polynomial-time approxi- mation algorithm for the well-studied Proportional Fairness (PF) axiom [ 13 ]. Our algorithm for the discrete setting also matches the best kn...
Read more

Fair budgets from ranked ballots: PB-EAR

How do you split a shared budget fairly when people rank projects that cost very different amounts? PB-EAR, from our AAAI 2021 paper  Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences  ( AAAI version ), gives every voter an equal slice of the budget and lets groups pool their slices to fund the projects they rank highest, looking further down the ballots only when nothing is yet affordable. Every cohesive group is guaranteed its proportional share, and the rule extends our  Expanding Approvals Rule  for elections to budgets with project costs, ties and unequal voter weights.  That makes it a natural fit for DAO grant rounds such as   TheDAO Security Fund 's ETHSecurity Initiatives, where badge holders will rank the security initiatives listed on   the app  to allocate the fund's budget. The two-minute video below walks through a worked example. Here's an educational tool someone built to show how PB-EAR works. 
Read more