Search, Mechanism Design and the Internet

I am reproducing the information about an exciting workshop which will be held at UCL on 12 and 13th June. The workshop is hosted by ELSE at the Wellcome Collection Conference Centre in London. The focus is on algorithmic mechanism design, recommendation systems and social networks.

Program:

Friday, 12 June 2009

9:00 - 9:30 Gathering and registration

9:30 - 10:15 Preston McAfee: Allocating Guaranteed Display Advertising
in an Exchange Environment

10:15 - 11:00 Michael Schwarz: Optimal Auction Design in a Multi-unit
Environment: The Case of Sponsored Search Auctions

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break

11:30 - 12:15 Sebastien Lahaie: An Expressive Auction Design for Online
Display Advertising

12:15 - 13:00 Tim Roughgarden: Differential Privacy [Relevant Readings]

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch

14:30 - 15:15 Yongmin Chen: Equilibrium Price Dispersion with
Heterogeneous Searchers

15:15 - 16:00 John Morgan: Shrouded Attributes and Information
Suppression: Evidence from Field Experiments

16:00 - 16:30 Coffee break

16:30 - 17:15 Jon Kleinberg: Cascading Behavior in Online Networks [Relevant Talk]

17:15 - 18:00 Eva Tardos: Quality of Learning Outcomes in (Congestion)
Games [Relevant Talk]

Saturday, 13 June 2009

9:30 - 10:15 Dirk Bergemann: Advertising and Sponsored Search

10:15 - 11:00 Jason Hartline: Mechanism Design and Money Burning


11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break


11:30 - 12:15 Moshe Babaioff: Characterizing Truthful Multi-Armed Bandit
Mechanisms [Relevant Paper]

12:15 - 13:30 Lunch

13:30 - 14:15 Susan Athey: Uncertainty and Equilibrium in Online
Advertising Auctions

14:15 - 15:00 Liad Blumrosen: Auctions with Online Supply


15:00 - 15:30 Coffee break

15:30 - 16:15 Amin Saberi: Adwords and Generalized Online Matching [Relevant video]

16:15 - 17:00 Paul Resnick: Manipulation Resistance and Information Loss
for Recommender Systems [Relevant Papers]

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