AAMAS 2009

The AAMAS accepted papers list is out. Our paper ‘False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation’ has been accepted. Papers which sound especially interesting include:

Comparing Trust Mechanisms for Monitoring Aggregator Nodes in Sensor Networks by Oly Mistry, Anil Gursel, Sandip Sen

Power in Normative Systems by Thomas Agotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek, Moshe Tennenholtz, Michael Wooldridge

Boolean Combinations of Weighted Voting Systems by Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge

Learning Equilibria in Repeated Congestion Games by Aviv Zohar, Moshe Tennenholtz

The Price of Democracy in Coalition Formation by Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukarov, Nick Jennings

Adding Incentives to File-Sharing Systems by Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey Rosenschein

Hedonic Coalition Nets Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge

Producing Timely Recommendations From Social Networks Through Targeted Search by ANIL GURSEL, Sandip Sen

How Similarity Helps to Efficiently Compute Kemeny Rankings Nadja Betzler, Michael Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier, Frances Rosamond


Combinatorial Prediction Markets for Event Hierarchies Mingyu Guo, David Pennock

Easy and Hard Coalition Formation Problems - Parameterized Complexity Analysis Tammar Shrot, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus

Computational Aspects of Shapley's Saddles Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein

Decentralised Dynamic Task Allocation: A Practical Game-Theoretic Approach Archie Chapman, Rosa Anna Micillo, Ramachandra Kota, Nick Jennings

Graph-Based Methods for the Analysis of Large-Scale Multiagent Systems Wilbur Peng, Alexander Grushin, Vikram Manikonda, William Krueger, Patrick Carlos, Michel Santos

On the Complexity of Schedule Control Problems for Knockout Tournaments Thuc Vu, Alon Altman, Yoav Shoham

Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai


Moreover, interesting tutorials include the following:

T1 - Reputation Systems
Mario Paolucci, Jordi Sabater-Mir, Torsten Eymann, Thijs Broekhuizen

T4 - Complex Negotiations for Intractable Problems
Takayuki Ito, Shaheen Fatima

T5 - Automated Mechanism Design: Methods and Applications
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Vincent Conitzer

T6 - Cooperative Games in Multi-Agent Systems
Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge, Georgios Chalkiadakis

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