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British Colloquium for Theoretical Computer Science 2010

The next BCTCS (British Colloquium for Theoretical Computer Science) will be held from 6th to 9th April in 2010. The colloquium has an impressive list of invited speakers: Erik Demaine (MIT) Johan Håstad (KTH Stockholm) Gil Kalai (HU Jerusalem) Kim Guldstrand Larsen (Aalborg) Catuscia Palamidessi (INRIA / École Polytechnique) Ulrike Sattler (Manchester)

The First Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems

I was notified of an interesting satellite workshop of the AAMAS conference. The workshop is on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems and is focused on cooperative games, coalition formation, negotiation and market and economics based cooperation.

Interesting course by Jack Edmonds

Details here . 

Visit to TU Delft and Amsterdam

I just returned from a research visit to TU Delft . My hosts were Tomas Klos , Cees Witteveen, Mathijs de Weerdt  and Yingqian Zhang. They are a part of an applied algorithms group with an increasing interest in game theory and mechanism design. It was great making some new contacts and getting feedback on some recent research. I received an award winning  Senz umbrella as a gift. The umbrella has been designed by people from TU Delft. The visit coincided with an MSc thesis defence of Bart de Keijzer who finished an excellent thesis . The main contribution of the thesis was identifying some structural properties of the lattice of canonical weighted voting games and enumerating them. This helps give exact solutions to designing weighted voting games with specific properties like minimum distance from a target power index vector. Congratulations Bart! The trip also gave me an opportunity to visit Amsterdam and meet up with Michiel, a friend i hadn't met in fo...

Are we in control of our own decisions?

Computation of Nash Equilibria in Finite Games

The latest volume of Economic Theory is based on a symposium organized by Prof von Stengel a while ago. The volume is totally focused on algorithmic techniques for the computation of Nash equlibria in finite games. It includes a well written and accessible  overview by Tim Roughgarden on the relevant computational complexity concepts for equilibrium computation.

Nobel lectures of game theorists/social choice theorists

2007 But Who Will Guard the Guardians? Leonid Hurwicz Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals Eric S. Maskin Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory  Roger B. Myerson  2005 War and Peace Robert J. Aumann An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima Thomas C. Schelling 1998  The Possibility of Social Choice Amartya Sen 1994  Games with Incomplete Information John C. Harsanyi John Nash   Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames Richard Selten   1978   Rational Decision-Making in Business Organization s Herbert Simon