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Showing posts from June 20, 2010

AGT in CACM

Tim Roughgarden briefly reviews algorithmic game theory in the latest edition of the CACM . He frames algorithmic game theory as a field addressesing the follows basic questions: To what extent is "incentive-compatible" efficient computation fundamentally less powerful than "classical" efficient computation? When, and in what senses, are game-theoretic equilibria guaranteed to approximately optimize natural objective functions? When can the participants of a game quickly converge to an equilibrium? More modestly, when can a centralized algorithm quickly compute an equilibrium?

COMSOC 2010

The accepted paper list is public : Sven Krumke and Clemens Thielen. Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens Thielen and Stephan Westphal. A Combinatorial Algorithm for Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions Yiling Chen, John Lai, David Parkes and Ariel Procaccia. Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting Ceyhun Coban and M. Remzi Sanver. Social Choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko. Distance Rationalization of Voting Rules Nadja Betzler. On Problem Kernels for Possible Winner Determination Under the k-Approval Protocol Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates Noga Alon, Felix Fischer, Ariel Procaccia and Moshe Tennenholtz. Sum of Us: Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors Michael Zuckerman and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. An Algorithm for th...