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Showing posts from February 28, 2010

Mechanism design in kidney exchange programs

The Gale-Shapley algorithm (to compute a stable two sided matching) is a popular example of the use of elegant mathematics to solve an important real world problem. The algorithm led to tremendous growth in the field of matching theory. Research was conducted both on the strategic (see for example Alvin Roth’s book ) and algorithmic aspects of  matching theory (see for example Gusfield and Irving’s book ). The results have had impact such as on  hospital-resident matching and kidney-exchange programs. A major research problem has been to get a handle on honesty and incentive to lie in various matching settings. As Malkevitch states : Another issue with respect to the honesty of the expressed preferences which are produced by the participants in the two-sided market has emerged from the analysis of what was done with choice mechanisms in the past...Researchers are now trying to study how to avoid this situation and get more "transparency." In the kidney exchan...

Al Roth discusses market design

EURO 2010

The EURO 2010 comprises of an impressive list of speakers. Interestingly, both the plenary speakers are game theorists: Harold W. Kuhn and John F. Nash , Jr. Other star invited speakers include Noga Alon and Stef Tijs .