Mechanism design in kidney exchange programs
The Gale-Shapley algorithm (to compute a stable two sided matching) is a popular example of the use of elegant mathematics to solve an important real world problem. The algorithm led to tremendous growth in the field of matching theory. Research was conducted both on the strategic (see for example Alvin Roth’s book ) and algorithmic aspects of matching theory (see for example Gusfield and Irving’s book ). The results have had impact such as on hospital-resident matching and kidney-exchange programs. A major research problem has been to get a handle on honesty and incentive to lie in various matching settings. As Malkevitch states : Another issue with respect to the honesty of the expressed preferences which are produced by the participants in the two-sided market has emerged from the analysis of what was done with choice mechanisms in the past...Researchers are now trying to study how to avoid this situation and get more "transparency." In the kidney exchan...