Saturday, April 13, 2013

Importance of Mathematics in Science

A recent article titled "Great Scientist ≠ Good at Math" by Harvard Biologist E. O. Wilson has caught a lot of attention. The article is based on a recently published book. A central message of the article is roughly that mathematical grounding is not important for scientists. The same points have also been made in a recent talk by Wilson (especially from 5.35 onwards):





Although Wilson makes some valid points in the article as well as in the video, he appears to be overly dismissive about the role of mathematics in formalizing ideas and building models. What also struck me was the subtitle of the article:
"E.O. Wilson shares a secret: Discoveries emerge from ideas, not number-crunching". 
The subtitle seems to equate mathematics to number-crunching which I found to frankly be ignorant of the fact that mathematicians highly value elegant ideas and beautiful arguments.

It was pleasing to see that a psychology professor and computer science professor have written a brief but effective reply to the article.  The reply concludes with the following lines:
Scientific creation can be largely mathematical, partly mathematical or not at all mathematical but it is always intense, detailed, difficult and self-critical. In the modern era, few succeed in their endeavours without a firm mathematical background.

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

ACM EC 2013

The accepted paper list is now public:


  • Designing for Diversity in Matching, Scott D Kominers and Tayfun Sonmez
  • Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd", Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour and Motty Perry
  • Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective, Yoav Wilf and Michal Feldman
  • The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions, Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan
  • Differential Pricing with inequity aversion in social networks, Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Social Learning and Aggregate Network Uncertainty, Ilan Lobel and Evan Sadler
  • Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method, Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala
  • Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers, Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim and Berthold Voecking
  • Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy, Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian Kash, Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan
  • Complex Contagion and The Weakness of Long Ties in Social Networks: Revisited, Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh and Jie Gao 
  • Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents, Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy
  • Optimizing Password Composition Policies, Jeremiah MBlocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel Procaccia and Or Sheffet
  • Potential games are necessary to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games, Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason Marden and Adam Wierman
  • Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents, Nikhil R Devanur, Bach Ha and Jason Hartline
  • Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders, Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan, Kulkarni Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden and Xiaoming Xu
  • A Network Approach to Public Goods, Matt Elliott and Ben Golub
  • Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information, Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff and Michael Grubb 
  • Learning Equilibria of Games via Payoff Queries, Rahul Savani, John Fearnley, Martin Gairing and Paul Goldberg
  • Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problem, Rodrigo Velez
  • A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Jose Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego and Vineet Goyal
  • Super Efficient Rational Proofs, Pablo Azar and Silvio Micali
  • Improved Bounds on the Price of Stability in Network Cost Sharing Games, Euiwoong Lee and Katrina Ligett
  • Real-time Optimization of Personalized Assortments, Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Paat Rusmevichientong
  • Bertrand Networks, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan
  • Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous Pools, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi
  • Selection and Influence in Cultural Dynamics, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens
  • Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions, Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian Kash and Peter Key
  • Harnessing the Power of Two Crossmatches, Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel Procaccia and Ankit Sharma 
  • When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?, Ioannis Caragiannis Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah
  • Incentives, gamification, and game theory: An economic approach to badge design, David Easley and Arpita Ghosh 
  • Auctions with Unique Equilibria, Shuchi Chawla and Jason Hartline
  • Competition Among Asymmetric Sellers With Fixed Supply, Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • On Discrete Preferences and Coordination, Flavio Chierichetti, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren
  • House Allocation with Indifferences: A generalization and a unified view, Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
  • An Axiomatic Characterization of Adaptive-Liquidity Market Maker, Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan 
  • Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
  • Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model, Elaine Wah and Michael Wellman
  • Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty, Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova and Jeff S. Shamma
  • Existence of Stable Matchings in Large Markets with Complementarities, Eduardo Azevedo and John Hatfield
  • Approximation in Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Yunan Li
  • Loss Calibarated Methods for Bipartite Rationing Problems, Herve Moulin and Jay Sethuraman
  • Mechanism Design for Fair Division: Allocating Divisible Items without Payments, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Gagan Goel
  • Budget Smoothing in Internet Ad Auctions: a Game Theoretic approach, Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R Devanur and Lei Wang 
  • On the Ratio of Revenue to Welfare in Single-Parameter Mechanism Design, Robert Kleinberg and Yang Yuan
  • Privacy and coordination: Computing on databases with endogenous participation, Arpita Ghosh and Katrina Ligett
  • Human-Agent Based Models of Cooperation in Public Goods Games, Michael Wunder, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts
  • Incentivizing participation in online forums for education, Arpita Ghosh and Jon Kleinberg
  • Sybil-proof Mechanisms in Query Incentive Networks, Wei Chen, Wang Yajun, Dongxiao Yu and Li Zhang
  • The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games, Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman
  • Which side chooses in large random matching markets?, Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria and Jacob Leshno
  • Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis 
  • What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act - Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets, Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen
  • Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport, Costis Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
  • Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale, Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme
  • Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions, Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos
  • Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange, John Dickerson, Ariel Procaccia and Tuomas Sandholm
  • Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions, Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Weintraub
  • Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker", Eric Budish and Aditya Bhave
  • Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions, Brandon Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald and Michael Wellman 
  • Down-to-the-Minute Effects of Super Bowl Advertising on Online Search Behavior, Randall A Lewis and David Reiley
  • A Combinatorial Prediction Market for the U.S. Elections, Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie, David Pennock and David Rothschild
  • Multi-parameter Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders, Nikhil R Devanur, Nitish Korula, Zhiyi Huang, Vahab Mirrokni and Qiqi Yan
  • The Virality--Efficiency Tradeoff, Sean J Taylor, Eytan Bakshy and Sinan Aral
  • Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition, Gabriel Carroll
  • Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • Two-sided Matching with Partial Information, Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica and Kevin Leyton-Brown 
  • Cost Function Market Makers for Measurable Spaces, Yiling Chen, Michael Ruberry and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
  • Best-Response Dynamics Out of Sync: Complexity and Characterization, Roee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira and David Wajc
  • Pick Your Poison: Pricing and Inventories at Unlicensed Online Pharmacies, Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin
  • The Truth Behind the Myth of the Folk Theorem, Seeman Lior, Rafael Pass and Joseph Halpern
  • Revenue Optimization in the Generalized Second-Price Auction, David Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown

Saturday, February 16, 2013

IMS workshops on Algorithmic Game Theory and Computational Social Choice


Mini-workshop on Mechanism Design: 10 - 11 Jan 2013.
Winter School and Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory: 14 - 18 Jan 2013.
Winter School and Workshop on Computational Social Choice: 21 - 25 Jan 2013.

This is a brief and personalised report on the Algorithmic Game Theory and Computational Social Choice workshops held from 14-25 January 2013 in Singapore. The workshops were focussed on the general interface between economics and computation. A wide variety of topics were covered. The talks initially focussed on mechanism design and auctions and then slowly turned towards game theory and finally social choice and fair division.

When I arrived in Singapore on the 13th of January, the mini-workshop on mechanism design had already finished. The workshop's highlight was an extensive tutorial by Jason Hartline. Singapore provided a great backdrop to the workshops. Algorithmic game theory and computational social choice has received a great boost in Singapore with the establishment of the research group by Edith Elkind and Ning Chen. I was also looking forward to my stay since Singapore has so many cultural aspects to explore and savour including the tasty fusion of Malay, Chinese and Indian food.

The algorithmic game theory workshop was held at the campus of Nanyang Technological University (NTU).
The workshop featured a number of talks on auctions and mechanism design by Stefano Leonardi, Amos Fiat, Mansour, Singer, Pai and co. Gianluigi Greco presented a tutorial on how structural decomposition methods are helpful in getting positive algorithmic results in equilibrium computation and winner determination. Martin Hoefer gave an entertaining talk on dynamics in matching markets. Since I had not heard Martin before, it was nice to get an overview of some of his interesting recent work. Jean-Francois Laslier gave a masterly whiteboard tutorial on tournament solutions. He focussed on some of the prominent results in the area such as uniqueness of minimal covering set and bipartisan set. Lirong took time out of his other speaking commitments to discuss  maximum likelihood approaches to social choice.

The afternoon session on the Thursday proved to be the most enjoyable with impressive talks by Xiaohui Bei, Xiaotie Deng, and Nicole Immorlica on resource allocation, incentives in games, and Schelling's segregation model. The final day of the game theory workshop featured tutorials from Kevin Leyton-Brown and Nicole Immorlica on modeling game-theoretic problems and matching markets respectively. Kevin was very convincing about the merit of modelling complex situations via action-graph games.

The weekend between the game theory and social choice workshops provided extra time for us to explore the sights, sounds, and especially the tastes of the city. China town looked especially festive because of the countdown to the Chinese New Year.

The computational social choice workshop was held at NUS (National University Singapore). The workshop started slowly with the first one and a half days focussing on tutorials on judgement aggregation and simple games by Ulle Endriss and Arkardi Slinko. One of the most interesting talks was by Biaoshuai Tao on ``Optimal proportional cake cutting with connected pieces''. Piotr Faliszewski's tutorial on multiwinner elections provided us with a window into the rich domain of algorithmic issues in multiwinner elections especially when the chosen winners need to maximize representation of the voters. Andrei Gomberg---one of the few economists at the worksop--- contributed greatly to the workshop with his tutorial and talk on revealed preferences and his numerous inputs to the discussions.  Yair Zick and Edith Elkind described some of their recent work on the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The workshop concluded with a tutorial by Jerome Lang on graphical languages for preference representation.

Nicta had a decent representation at the workshops. Nick Mattei presented on the ``Empirical analysis of voting rules and large datasets''. Toby Walsh gave a tutorial on the ``complexity of manipulating voting rules'' and a talk on sequential allocation of indivisible goods. I talked about `` the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice''. The talk was based on joint work with Markus Brill and Felix Brandt.

The workshops were organized by Ning Chen and
Edith Elkind both from Nanyang Technological University. It is hoped that we will see further editions of such meetings.

Monday, February 4, 2013

Fermat's Last Theorem: documentary

BBC has aired a documentary based on Simon Singh's book...fascinating. Hat tip to Felix Brandt.

Saturday, December 15, 2012

CoopMAS 2013


The Fourth Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems (CoopMAS-2013)

https://sites.google.com/site/coopmas2013/home
May 6 or 7, 2013

Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA

Co-located with the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013)


The use of cooperative game theory to study how agents should cooperate and collaborate, along with the related topic of coalition formation, has received growing attention from the multiagent systems,
game theory, and electronic commerce communities.

The workshop is intended to focus on topics in cooperation in multi-agent systems, cooperative game
theory and cooperative solution concepts, formation of coalitions, negotiation between agents, joint
decision making, and voting. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

Cooperative game theory
Coalition formation
Joint decision making and voting
Representation issues
Negotiation
Collaborative filtering
Market and economics based cooperation
Interact with humans (negotiation / collaboration)

The workshop should be of interest to researchers in cooperative game theory and coalition formation,
as well as to those who examine collaboration between agents, cooperation in multiagent systems and
design and implement collaborating agents.

We also welcome participants who are interested in applications of cooperative game theory,
which include trading agents, sponsored search and recommender systems.